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Abstract 
This paper analyses the effects of the crisis on trust in national and European Union institutions within 
an EU27 country sample from 1999 to 2012. The paper finds that the overall negative trends in trust 
throughout the crisis are driven by countries from the eurozone (EA12). However, whereas the crisis 
triggered only moderate declines of trust within eight core countries of the EA12, a significant decline 
of trust can be detected within four periphery countries, namely Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. 
Econometric results reveal that, amongst others, the significant increase in unemployment rates in 
those four countries, especially in Spain, largely contributed to this pronounced fall in trust. 
Keywords 
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 1 
Introduction* 
The recent (and ongoing) financial and economic crisis has been one of the most severe since the great 
depression in the 1930s for most advanced economies worldwide, including the economies of the 
European Union (EU) and especially the members of the euro area (EA) (EEAG 2010). Within the 
EA, the financial and economic crisis has evolved into a sovereign debt crisis from 2010 onwards (De 
Grauwe 2010). To overcome this sovereign debt crisis, fiscal austerity measures in many EA countries 
have been implemented throughout the crisis (Corsetti 2012). The severity of implementation of 
austerity measures has been particularly pronounced in the periphery countries of the EA, particularly 
in Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Theodoropoulou and Watt 2011) as well as Spain (Navarro 2012). 
Amongst others, these measures have led to a significant increase of unemployment levels in those 
four countries. Given the exceptional magnitude of the crisis, this paper analyses its impact on 
citizens’ trust in national and European Union institutions within an EU27 country sample and a 13-
year timeframe (1999 to 2012). More concretely, the paper analyses the impact of the crisis on 
citizens’ trust in their i) national government (NG), ii) national parliament (NP), iii) European 
Commission (EC) and iv) European Parliament (EP). 
As the impact of the crisis is the central thesis of the paper, when presenting the descriptive and 
econometric results, next to a full sample, a pre-crisis (1999-2008) will consequently be compared to a 
crisis sample (2008-2012).
1
 The paper will be organised into five sections. Section 1 of the paper will 
first embed the concept of citizens’ trust in national and EU institutions within the overall concept of 
systemic trust and will elaborate on the theoretical consequences of a potential decline of citizens’ 
trust throughout the crisis. It will also identify the main economic drivers for a potential decline in 
trust throughout the crisis. In section 2, the paper will discuss the underlying model specification, the 
chosen research design and the data utilised. In section 3, trends in trust in all four institutions will be 
discussed in detail. Section 4 will first discuss the methodological issues on the adequacy of the 
estimation strategy. Second, it will present the results of a fixed effects dynamic feasible generalised 
least squares (FE-DFGLS) estimation for the baseline equation utilising an EA12 country sample. 
Third, it will discuss the descriptive and econometric results in the light of the previous given 
empirical literature. Section 5 concludes and puts forward the main empirical findings.  
1. Theoretical links 
1.1 The consequences of citizens’ declining trust in national and EU institutions 
The literature on trust broadly groups the phenomenon into three distinct typologies: thick, 
interpersonal and systemic (Roth 2009). As this paper is interested in institutional trust, and more 
concretely trust in national and EU-level institutions, it will focus on the third classification, systemic 
trust. 
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1
 We identify the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 as the peak of the financial crisis and the start of the 
real economic crisis. Although the financial and economic crisis started as early as 2007 (Stiglitz 2012: 1), the 
bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers functioned as an important trigger, unleashing the full potential of the financial and 
economic crisis. The significant impact of the bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers on financial stress has been highlighted 
by the literature from the discipline of international finance (see Figures 4 and 5 in Xin et al. 2009).  
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The notion of systemic trust has been prominently used by the discipline of sociology. Within this 
discipline the important role of systemic trust has been stressed in stabilising the foundations and 
securing the functioning of modern societies (Giddens 1996; Luhmann 2000). In this context, Giddens 
(1996: 166) warns that a decreasing level of systemic trust has in some cases the potential to break 
apart institutional arrangements. With respect to the latter argument, political scientists such as 
Kaltenthaler et al. (2010: 1262) focus on trust in (policy-making) institutions. Alongside Kosfeld et al. 
(2005: 673), Kaltenthaler et al. (2010: 1262) argue that a certain level of citizens’ trust in a (policy-
making) institution is crucial for the legitimacy of that institution and that in the absence of trust its 
legitimacy is endangered. In addition, without sufficient trust, citizens might begin to undermine the 
authority of the institution (Kaltenthaler et al. 2010: 1261), which might ultimately lead to its 
abolishment (Giddens 1996: 166).  
But at which i) levels of trust and at which ii) rate of decline of trust are institutions threatened with 
dissolution? Two arguments from the existing literature can be brought forward to shed light on these 
two questions.  
Concerning i), Kaltenthaler et al. (2010: 1262), in discussing the concept of trust in the ECB, 
clarify that it would be worrying once “large numbers” of citizens start to distrust the institution. 
Building upon this argumentation and applying it to the four (policy-making) institutions in question, 
we conclude that it would be worrying for the legitimacy and hence the very survival of national and 
European institutions once “large numbers” of citizens would mistrust them.  
Concerning ii), Newton clarifies, in the context of trust in national parliaments, that “a sudden or 
consistent decline in confidence in it is a serious matter” (Newton 2001: 205). Building upon 
Newton’s reasoning for the national parliament, we conclude that it should be regarded as worrying 
for the legitimacy and hence sustainability of national and European institutions if there were a steady 
decline of trust that departs from its long-term path. 
Before discussing potential driving factors behind the trend towards a decline in trust over time and 
throughout the crisis, a more general set of arguments concerning the consequences of low levels of 
trust in the government, as highlighted by political scientists such as Joseph Nye, should be 
mentioned. Nye (1997) identifies three distinct consequences of a lack of citizens’ trust in the 
government: i) citizens will try to hold back tax money, ii) young talented graduates will not be 
willing to work for the government and iii) the overall compliance with law will decrease.  
1.2 Driving factors of declining trust in national and European institutions 
Following the empirical approach by Stevenson and Wolfers (2011)
2
, when trying to explain the 
within variation of trust over the 13-year time period, and here in particular over the crisis period, this 
paper will primarily focus on the relationship between unemployment and trust. However, 
unemployment will be embedded within a model specification consisting of three macroeconomic 
base control variables: inflation, growth of GDP per capita and debt as a share of GDP.
3
 Among these 
three control variables, inflation and growth of GDP are well embedded within the literature on 
popularity functions (Nannestad and Paldam 1994: 215-16; Bellucci and Lewis-Beck 2011: 192-94).
4
. 
                                                     
2
 The empirical approach by Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) builds upon the concluding remarks by Lawrence (1997: 132) 
that “our understanding (…) between economic performance and trust leaves much to be desired”. 
3
 We do not worry about potential collinearity between growth of GDP per capita and unemployment as might be referred 
by Okun’s law (1962) as most EA (and EU) countries are characterized by rigid labor market systems. Thus 
unemployment rates should follow the growth of GDP per capita by a lagged effect of at least one year. Indeed the 
correlation between our variables growth of GDP per capita and unemployment is only -0.20 in the EA12 country 
sample. 
4
 As this paper’s foremost concern is in explaining systemic trust, it does not attempt to add any new evidence to the 
literature on popularity functions where at present there already exists substantial material (Bellucci and Lewis-Beck 
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The variable of debt over GDP is more unusual but its inclusion as a control variable seems to be 
adequate in order to take the finding by Roth (2011) into consideration that an increase in debt over 
GDP, due to a bail-out of the financial sector by the government as e.g. in the Irish case in 2010, is 
associated with a significant decline of citizens’ trust in the national parliament. As recent empirical 
literature has depicted an increase in sovereign bond yields to be an important driver of trust in the 
European Commission throughout the crisis (Wälti, 2012), this indicator was included in the 
sensitivity analysis (see Table 5). 
2. Model specification, research design and data 
2.1 Model specification 
In the baseline model with an unbalanced panel, net trust in the NG/NP and EC/EP are estimated as a 
function of unemployment, inflation, growth of GDP per capita, debt per GDP and other important 
control variables. As this paper is first and foremost interested in explaining trust trends over time, in 
particular throughout the crisis period, and thus explaining the within-variation of the single trust 
trends (and not in explaining the cross-sectoral variance between countries), it utilises a fixed-effects 
estimation approach. The baseline model for the fixed-effects estimation, which holds in the long term 
when all adjustments have come to an end, would read as follows: 
Trust it = αi + β Unemployment it +  Inflation it +  Growth it +  Debt it +   Z it + wit (1) 
where i represents each country and t represents each time period. Trust it is the net trust amount in 
national and EU institutions for country i during period t. Unemployment it, Inflation it, Growth it, Debt 
it and Z it are respectively unemployment, inflation, growth of GDP per capita and debt per GDP and 
important control variables, such as electorate dummy variables
5
 for the national institutions and the 
European Parliament for country i during period t or indicators of financial stress such as sovereign 
bond yields. The variable αi represents a country-specific constant term and wit is the error term. Since 
we utilise an FGLS estimation approach, our baseline estimation does not include time dummies as 
they are incompatible with FGLS.
6
 
2.2 Research design 
As the descriptive analysis in section 3 will show, the actual decrease in population-weighted trust in 
the national and EU institutions is strongly driven by the periphery countries of the original 12 
member states of the euro area (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – the EA12) the econometric analysis in section 4 
will utilise an EA12 country sample for its baseline estimation and will analyse various other country 
samples such as the EU15/27, and NMS12 country sample within its sensitivity analysis. Thus, the 
baseline econometric analysis will estimate equation (1) with the help of an EA12 country sample over 
the time period 1999 to 2012. Due to missing data from the control variable debt over GDP, however, 
the actual econometric estimation in section 4 starts as late as 2000 with overall 27 time periods (from 
4-5/2000 to 11/2012) being included in the analysis.
7
 With given t=27 and n=12, thus with a ratio of 
(Contd.)                                                                  
2011:190). Nevertheless, drawing on the popularity function literature seems to be pragmatic in order to argue for the 
inclusion of inflation and growth of GDP per capita within this paper’s utilized model specification.  
5
 Electorate dummies were included to control for significant upswings after an electoral process. Those dummies are 
highly significant and show a strongly positive association with trust in the NG, NP and EP. Excluding the electoral 
dummy, however, does not alter the regression results in any significant manner. Results can be obtained from the 
authors upon request. 
6
 A more detailed explanation is given in section 4. 
7
 This leads to the loss of the two time periods of 3-4/1999 and 10-11/1999 within the econometric analysis. 
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t/n of 2.25 estimation of equation (1) with the help of time series econometrics seems to be an 
attractive option. As we have identified the events associated with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008 (see reasoning above) as the start of the crisis, the depicted econometric results in 
section 4 will consequently differentiate a pre-crisis period (4-5/2000–3-5/2008) from a crisis period 
(10-11/2008–11/2012). 
2.3 Data  
Measures for trust in the NG, NP, the EC and the EP were based upon the biannual Standard 
Eurobarometer (hereafter referred to as EB) surveys
8
 from spring 1999 (EB51) to autumn 2012 
(EB78) by asking respondents the following question: “I would like to ask you a question about how 
much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you 
tend to trust it or tend not to trust it”.9 10 11 The respondent is then presented a range of institutions. 
With respect to the answers “Tend to trust it” and “Tend not to trust it”, a third category, “Don’t 
know”, can be selected by the respondents. Following a concept as introduced by Gärtner (1997: 488-
89), we utilise a ‘net trust’ measure, which is obtained by subtracting the percentage of those who trust 
from those who do not trust the institution according to the following equation:  
Net trust = 
     
                        
 - 
        
                        
     (2)12 
The trust data are matched to our macroeconomic data according to a procedure as proposed by Wälti 
(2012: 597).
13
 
 Monthly data on inflation (HICP), unemployment and sovereign debt yield rates were taken 
from Eurostat. The values for unemployment were seasonally adjusted.  
                                                     
8
 Standard EB surveys normally cover about 1,000 respondents per member country in the EU. The interviews are 
conducted face-to-face in the home of the respondents. For each Standard EB survey, new and independent samples are 
drawn. The basic sampling design in all EU member states is multi-stage and random (probability), thereby guaranteeing 
the polling of a representative sample of the population. 
9
 Standard EB 51 is the first Standard EB survey to include the four trust items as used in this paper. Furthermore, 
following the literature (Jones 2009; Ehrmann et al. 2013; c.f. Wälti 2012), to gain additional insights into the effect of 
the crisis on net trust, the observations from the Special EB 71.1 in January-February 2009 were also taken into 
consideration. Data from EB 71.1 are based on the precise same items as the standard EBs. As standard EBs embed the 
trust items in various alternating questionnaire frames, a rejection of data from Special EB71.1 due to framing effects 
seems unsound (c.f. Wälti 2012). In addition, the exclusion of data from EB71.1 within the sensitivity analysis in Table 5 
does not alter the econometric results in any significant manner.  
10
 The raw data are available on CD-ROM from Gesis ZA Data Service for Standard EBs 51-62 (Gesis, 2005a,b) and were 
received on request from Gesis ZA Data Service for Standard EBs 63-69 (Gesis 2009). Data for the Standard EBs 70-78 
and Special EB 71.1 were taken from the European Commission’s tables of results (2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010a, 2010b, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012a, 2012b).  
11
 For the two European institutions – European Commission and European Parliament – the question actually reads: “For 
each of the following European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not to trust it.”  
12
 As the “Don’t know” answers for the two European institutions reach values of 30 percentage points and higher and as 
these answers fluctuate over time a net measure of trust seems to be more adequate than a pure measure of trust to 
account for these fluctuations. However, it should be pointed out that net trust and trust measures correlate as high as 0.99 
for the NG and NP and 0.93 for the EC and 0.94 for the EP. In addition, as the sensitivity results in Table 5 show, the use 
of trust instead of net trust has no significant influence on the econometric results except, as expected, that coefficients 
are approximately twice as high with net trust than trust.  
13
 Although Wälti’s (2012) monthly matching methodology correlates as high as 0.99 for the variables unemployment and 
inflation and 0.95 for the variable growth of GDP per capita in comparison to a semester matching methodology, a 
monthly methodological approach seems to be more adequate to prevent any potential overlap between the explanatory 
macroeconomic variables and the EB data. The precise polling for the EBs are depicted in the legend of the x-axis in 
Figures 1-4. 
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 Quarterly data on GDP,
14
 population size
15
 and debt over GDP
16
 were taken from Eurostat’s 
quarterly data. In order to apply the monthly matching approach, the quarterly data were 
interpolated to gain monthly observations.
17
  
 Data on national and European elections were taken from the electoral database on parliamentary 
elections from the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS 2011).  
3. Descriptive statistics 
3.1 Net trust in the national government and European Commission 
Figure 1 shows citizens’ net trust in the NG and the EC in an EU15/27 country sample from 1999 to 
2012 (all single time trends are depicted in Figures A1 and A3 in the Appendix). In order to correctly 
depict the overall trend of the EU15/27, population-weighted trust trends are utilised in Figure 1, as 
well as the following Figures 2-4 and Tables 1 and 2.
18
 In analysing Figure 1, four important patterns 
are of direct relevance. First, a steady and marked decline in trust in the EC of -24/-23 percentage 
points in the EU15/27 throughout the crisis period can be detected. In comparison, a decline in trust in 
the NG by -10/-9 percentage points in the EU15/27 can be considered moderate. Second, when 
comparing the mean levels of the pre-crisis period with the crisis period in the EU15, the decline of 
trust in the EC was steeper, with a 18 percentage points decline in mean levels in the crisis period 
compared to the pre-crisis period, than trust in the NG at 12 percentage points. Third, levels of trust in 
the EC still remain well above those in the NG over the whole time frame. Whereas large numbers of 
citizens mistrust the NG (341 million citizens mistrust vs. 139 million who trust) in the EU27 in 
November 2012, trust in the EC is still relatively equally distributed (with 222 million mistrusting vs. 
203 million trusting). Fourth, as there were no pronounced differences in standard deviations in the 
pre-crisis or crisis periods for either trust trends (3 and -1 percentage points), we conclude that both 
trends followed their long-term paths in the midst of the crisis. 
  
                                                     
14
 GDP data were seasonally adjusted and chain-linked with 2005 as the reference year. Data on GDP were missing for 
Greece, Malta and Romania for the first semester in 2000 and for Greece for the 2nd semester of 2011 and both semesters 
in 2012. 
15
 Due to inconsistencies and breaks in various country series within the official Eurostat dataset, values had to be replaced 
by means of interpolation whenever necessary.  
16
 Data on debt over GDP only starts from the 1st of the year of 2000 onwards. Data on Greece and Malta are missing for 
the 1st semester of 2000.  
17
 Potential measurement errors from the applied interpolation seem unlikely as the monthly constructed variables correlate 
with the semester data as high as 0.99 for debt over GDP and 0.95 for growth of GDP per capita.  
18
 Non-population weighted aggregates for the EU15 and EA12 only vary slightly from the population-weighted trends. 
However due to highly negative values in low populated countries such as Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia, the non-
population-weighted averages are slightly lower than the population-weighted averages in an EU27 country sample. As 
the descriptive analysis is foremost interested in trend measures that depict a relative measure concerning the absolute 
size of a country’s population, weighted trends were utilised. In order to spell out an overall European policy conclusion, 
it seems to be more important if a large majority in Spain with an overall population size of approximately 46 million 
starts to mistrust the national and EU institutions in comparison to a large majority in Cyprus with an overall population 
size of approximately 862,000 and thus representing 1/50 of Spanish citizens. In fact, Spanish citizens alone represent 
almost 1/10 of all EU27 citizens (approximately 504 million). Cypriot citizens represent only 1/600 of EU27 citizens. 
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Figure 1. 
Trust in the national government and European Commission in the EU15/27 (1999–2012) 
 
 
Notes: NG = national government, EC = European Commission. Values are population weighted for the respective country 
samples. In 1-2/2009, the special Standard EB 71.1 was used. As the survey item concerning trust in the NG was not included 
in Standard EBs 52, 53, 54 or 58, the data for these four observation points respectively are missing. The dashed line 
represents the start of the crisis in September 2008 and differentiates the pre-crisis from the crisis period. From 10-11/2004 to 
9-10/2006, the EU-27 country sample consists of EU-25 countries excluding Romania and Bulgaria. From 4-5/2007 onwards, 
Romania and Bulgaria are included. As the figure depicts net trust, all values above 0 indicate trust by a majority of the 
respondents and all values below 0 show a lack of trust by the majority.  
Sources: Standard EBs 51-78 and Special EB 71.1. 
3.2 Net trust in the national parliament and the European Parliament  
Figure 2 shows citizens’ net trust in the NP and the EP in an EU15/27 country sample from 1999 to 
2012 (all single time trends are depicted in Figures A2 and A4 in the Appendix). In analysing Figure 
1, four important patterns are of direct relevance for our analysis. First, a steady and pronounced 
decline of trust in the EP of -27/-24 percentage points in the EU15/27 throughout the crisis period can 
be seen. In comparison, decreasing trust in the NP of -16/-13 percentage points in the EU15/27 was 
less strong but still notable. Second, when comparing the mean levels of the pre-crisis period with the 
crisis period in the EU15, the fall in trust in the EP was sharper, at 22 percentage points, than trust in 
the NP at 16 percentage points. Third, levels of trust in the EP remained well above those in the NP 
over the whole time frame. Whereas large numbers of citizens mistrust the NP (331 million citizens 
mistrust compared to 140 million who trust) in the EU27 in November 2012, trust in the EP is still 
relatively equally distributed (with 226 million citizens mistrusting vs. 220 million trusting). Fourth, as 
there were no pronounced differences in standard deviations in the pre-crisis or crisis periods in either 
trust trends (3 and -1 percentage points), we conclude that both trends followed their long-term paths 
throughout the crisis. 
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Figure 2. 
Trust in national parliaments and the European Parliament in the EU15/27 (1999–2012) 
 
 
Notes: NP = national parliament, EP = European Parliament. Values are population weighted for the respective country 
samples. In 1-2/2009 the special Standard EB 71.1 was used. As the survey item concerning trust in the NP was not included 
in Standard EBs 52, 53 or 58, the data for these three observation points respectively are missing. The dashed line represents 
the start of the crisis in September 2008 and differentiates the pre-crisis from the crisis period. From 10-11/2004 to 9-
10/2006, the EU-27 country sample consists of EU-25 countries excluding Romania and Bulgaria. From 4-5/2007 onwards, 
Romania and Bulgaria are included. As the figure depicts net trust, all values above 0 indicate trust by a majority of the 
respondents and all values below 0 show a lack of trust by the majority.  
Sources: Standard EBs 51-78 and Special EB 71.1. 
3.3 Before and after comparison in an EA12, EU15, NMS12 and EU27 country sample 
Table 1 depicts the values for the changes in net trust from 3-5/2008 to 11/2012 for the EU15/27, the 
EA12 and the 12 new member states (NMS12) country samples. Although, all three samples EU15/27 
and EA12 follow a similar pattern, with trust in the EC and EP declined significantly by around 25 
percentage points and trust in the NG and NP declined by around 10 and 15 percentage points) trust 
declined most significantly in the EA12 country sample. In contrast in the NMS12 country sample 
trust has declined the least.
19
 Taking this pattern into consideration, it seems sound to conclude that 
countries in the EA12 country sample appear to be determining the overall trend.
20
  
  
                                                     
19
 The NMS12 country sample consists of the 12 new member states that acceded to the EU from 2004 onwards. They 
include Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. As the trends are population-weighted, this is strongly due to Poland, which has not experienced any significant 
decline of trust. All four trust levels remained relatively stable concerning the before and after comparison (see also 
Tables A1-A4 in the Appendix). Cyprus faced a significant decline of trust in the NG and NP (see Figure 5 at the end of 
this section).  
20
 As the trends shown are population-weighted, this conclusion is not too surprising given that the EA12 countries 
comprise more than three-fifths (approximately 323 of 504 million citizens) of the overall population of the EU27. In 
addition, the three EU15 and non-EA12 countries – namely Denmark, Sweden and the UK – only experienced moderate 
declines in trust (see also Figures A1-A4 in the Appendix). Trust in the NG and NP actually increased in Sweden.  
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Table 1. 
Net trust levels and changes in net trust in the EA12, EU15, NMS12 and EU27 (2008–12) 
Sample  Trust Level: 3-5/ 2008 Level: 11/ 2012 Changes: 11/ 2012 – 3-5/ 2008 
EA12 NG/NP -25/-16 -38/-34 -13/-18 
EU15 NG/NP -28/-17 -38/-33 -10/-16 
NMS12 NG/NP -44/-55 -51/-58 -7/-3 
EU27 NG/NP -31/-25 -40/-38 -9/-13 
EA12 EC/EP 21/27 -7/-3 -28/-30 
EU15 EC/EP 14/19 -10/-8 -24/-27 
NMS12 EC/EP 34/38 22/24 -12/-14 
EU27 EC/EP 19/23 -4/-1 -23/-24 
 
Notes: EA = Euro Area, EU = European Union, NMS = New Member States, NG = National Government, NP = National 
Parliament, EC = European Commission, EP = European Parliament. Values are population-weighted for the respective 
country samples. As the table presents data on net trust, all values above 0 indicate trust by a majority of the respondents and 
all values below 0 show a lack of trust by the majority. The periods still reflecting trust by a majority of citizens are shaded in 
light grey. Values reflecting the strongest decline are shaded in dark grey.  
Sources: Standard EBs 69 and 78. 
3.4 Net trust levels and changes in the EA4, EA8 and selected EA12 countries  
With the presumptions that countries from the EA12 might be responsible for the overall decline in 
population-weighted trust trends in the EU15/27 sample, Table 2 shows the values for the changes in 
net trust for selected countries in the EA12 (namely Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Germany 
and France) along with a sample of periphery countries, the EA-4 (Spain, Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland) and a core country sample, the EA8 (Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Finland, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg). After differentiating the trends of the EA8 and EA4 countries, the 
most interesting patterns appear.  
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Table 2. 
Net trust levels and changes in net trust in the EA8 and EA4 and across selected EA12 countries 
(2008–12) 
Sample/ 
Country 
Trust  Levels: 3-5/2008 Levels: 11/2012 Changes: 11/2012 – 3-5/2008 
EA4 NG/NP 3/10 -72/-72 -75/-82 
EA8 NG/NP -33/-23 -28/-24 5/-1 
Spain NG/NP 20/20 -75/-76 -95/-96 
Greece NG/NP -31/-2 -84/-80 -53/-78 
Portugal NG/NP -29/-3 -52/-50 -23/-47 
Ireland NG/NP -14/-15 -58/-57 -44/-42 
Italy NG/NP -59/-57 -60/-71 -1/-14 
France NG/NP -38/-21 -35/-26 3/-5 
Germany NG/NP -25/-15 -12/-1 13/14 
EA4 EC/EP 38/37 -35/-30 -73/-67 
EA8 EC/EP 16/22 1/6 -15/-16 
Spain EC/EP 42/46 -41/-41 -83/-87 
Greece EC/EP 13/21 -57/-42 -70/-63 
Portugal EC/EP 42/46 -1/1 -43/-45 
Ireland EC/EP 43/51 3/3 -40/-48 
Italy EC/EP 29/29 -2/1 -31/-28 
France EC/EP 11/19 4/9 -7/-10 
Germany EC/EP 6/18 -4/2 -10/-16 
 
Notes: EA = euro area, NG = national government, NP = national parliament, EC = European Commission, EP = European 
Parliament. The EA8 and EA4 country samples are population-weighted. The pronounced differences between the EA8 and 
EA4, as well as the minimum and maximum values are shaded. Darker shading represents maximum values. Lighter shading 
represents minimum values. As the table presents data on net trust, all values above 0 indicate trust by a majority of the 
respondents and all values below 0 show a lack of trust by the majority.  
Sources: Standard EBs 69 and 78.  
First, whereas in the EA4, trust in the NG declined by -75/-82 percentage points, it actually increased 
by 5 percentage points in the EA8 and trust in the NP remained nearly unchanged with a mere 
decrease of 1 percentage points. In the EA4, the pronounced declines were driven by Spain, where 
trust in the NG/NP fell by 95/96 percentage points respectively (from 20/20 to -75/-76%).
21
 In Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland, trust in the NG/NP fell by 53/78, 23/47 and 44/42 percentage points.
22
 In the 
EA8 country sample, the positive and unchanged trend was largely driven by Germany, which enjoyed 
increases of 13/14. In France trust remained nearly constant with 3/-5 percentage points, respectively. 
Although the levels of trust in Italy were significantly lower than those in Germany and France, falls 
of -1/-14 percentage points were moderate compared with the decreases in the EA4.  
Second, while in the EA4 the fall of 73/67 percentage points in the trust in the EC and EP was 
similar to the fall in trust of the NG/NP, in the EA8 trust in the EC/EP declined less sharply by 15/16 
percentage points. The substantial decline in the EA4 countries was driven by Spain, where trust in the 
EC/EP fell by 83/87 percentage points.
23
 In Greece, Portugal and Ireland, trust in the EC/EP declined 
                                                     
21
 This was the most pronounced decline in the EU15/EA12. In spring 2012, only 11% of Spanish citizens still trusted the 
NG and 9% the NP. As can be seen from Figures A1 and A2, however, one country, the new euro area member Cyprus 
(from 2008 onwards) encountered even steeper declines in trust of 113% and 115% in the NG and NP, respectively.  
22
 Only 7% of citizens still trusted the NG in Greece in autumn 2012. 
23
 Both declines were the most pronounced in the EU27. 
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by 70/63, 43/45 and 40/48 percentage points, respectively.
24
 The decrease in the EA8 countries was 
driven by moderate declines in France and Germany and a more pronounced one in Italy.  
3.5 Net trust trends in the EA4 
Figure 3 shows citizens’ net trust in the NG, NP, EC and EP in the countries of the periphery (EA-4 
country sample) from 1999 to 2012. In the pre-crisis period, all four trust trends were very stable 
around the mean values of 0% for the NG and NP and 35% for the EC and EP, with standard 
deviations of around 6-8%. In the crisis period, all four trust trends fell steadily, with standard 
deviations rising to 18-20% and the mean levels dropping to approximately  
-40% for the NG and NP and to around 0% for the EC and EP, resulting in an overall decline in mean 
levels of around 30% to 40% in trust in all four institutions. Given these values, we conclude that trust 
trends in the crisis period deviated from their long-term paths in the midst of the crisis.  
Figure 3. 
Trust in national and EU institutions in the EA4 (1999–2012) 
 
 
Notes: The EA4 comprises Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. NG = national government, NP = national parliament, EC = 
European Commission, EP = European Parliament. Values are population-weighted. In 1-2/2009 the special Standard EB 
71.1 was utilised. As the survey item concerning trust in the NP was not included in Standard EBs 52, 53 or 58, the data for 
these three observation points respectively are missing. As the survey item concerning trust in the NG was not included in 
Standard EBs 52, 53, 54 or 58, the data for these four observation points respectively are missing. The dashed line represents 
the start of the crisis in September 2008 and differentiates the pre-crisis and crisis periods. As the figure depicts net trust, all 
values above 0 indicate trust by a majority of the respondents and all values below 0 show a lack of trust by the majority.  
Sources: Standard EBs 51-78 and Special EB 71.1. 
3.6 Net trust trends in the EA8 
Figure 4 shows citizens’ net trust in the NG, NP, EC and EP in the EA8 country sample from 1999 to 
2012. With no significant difference appearing in the standard deviations in the pre-crisis or crisis 
periods, all four trust trends followed their pre-crisis paths. In addition, the mean levels of trust in the 
NG and NP only moderately declined by 4 and 7 percentage points, respectively. The mean levels of 
trust in the EC and EP showed steeper falls, by 15 and 20 percentage points. Given these values, we 
conclude that whereas trust in the NG and NP was not affected at all by the crisis, trust in the EC and 
EP declined significantly in the course of the crisis. This declining trend, however, still followed its 
long-term path in the midst of the crisis.  
                                                     
24
 For Greece it has to be pointed out that in autumn 2012, trust in the EC (-57%) reached the lowest level in the EU27 over 
the 13-year period. 
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Figure 4. 
Trust in national and EU institutions in the EA-8 (1999–2012) 
 
 
Notes: The EA8 comprises Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. NG = 
national government, NP = national parliament, EC = European Commission, EP = European Parliament. Values are 
population weighted. In 1-2/2009 the special Standard EB 71.1 was used. As the survey item concerning trust in the NP was 
not included in Standard EBs 52, 53 or 58, the data for these three observation points respectively are missing. As the survey 
item concerning trust in the NG was not included in Standard EBs 52, 53, 54 or 58, the data for these four observation points 
respectively are missing. The dashed line represents the start of the crisis in September 2008 and differentiates the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods. As the figure depicts net trust, all values above 0 indicate trust by a majority of the respondents and all 
values below 0 show a lack of trust by the majority.  
Sources: Standard EBs 51-78 and Special EB 71.1. 
3.7 Unemployment and Trust – A before and after comparison 
Having shown in Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 that the EA4 and EA8 country samples follow very 
different trust trends throughout the crisis period, it now seems to be of interest to identify the driving 
factor behind the diverging trends. Figure 5 shows a scatter plot between the changes of the 
unemployment rate (∆ur) from 3-5/2008 to 11/2012 and the changes for trust (∆Trust) from 3-5/2008 
to 11/2012, as depicted for selected EA12 countries in Table 2 (Before and After Comparison). In all 
four figures there is a significant negative association between ∆ur and ∆Trust with the most 
pronounced association between ∆ur and ∆Trust in the NP with a correlation of -0.97. The correlations 
between ∆ur and ∆Trust in the EP is -0.92, ∆Trust in the EC is -0.93 and ∆Trust in the NG is -0.94. 
When analysing the EA12, Greece and Spain faced the largest increase in unemployment in all four 
scatterplots and the most pronounced decline in trust. In Greece and Spain unemployment increased 
by 17.5 percentage points and 16.6 percentage points, respectively. Greece and Spain are followed by 
Ireland with an increase in the unemployment rate of 10 percentage points and Portugal with 7.5 
percentage points. As pointed out in the figure, within an EU27 country sample, Cyprus acts as an 
outlier, as the trust decline in the NG and NP should be less pronounced when considering its 
unemployment rate.  
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Figure 5.  
Scatter plot between delta unemployment and delta trust 
 
 
Notes: Fitted regression line only for EA12 country sample.  
Sources: Standard EB 69 & 78 and Eurobarometer data.  
In order to corroborate these first descriptive findings, the following section 4 will now estimate the 
association between an increase in unemployment and a decrease of trust via an econometric 
estimation. 
4. Econometric analysis 
4.1 Discussion on the adequacy of the estimation procedure  
The issue of endogeneity  
When running regressions such as in equation (1), one must be aware of the possibility that the right-
hand side variables (unemployment, inflation, growth and debt) might be endogenous (affected by a 
common event) or stand in a bi-directional relationship with trust (a low level of trust might lead to a 
self-fulfilling prophecy and might speed up and worsen an already existing downturn). Therefore, we 
estimated equation (1) by means of dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS), a method that controls for 
endogeneity of the regressors (Stock and Watson 1993; Wooldridge 2009).
25
 It can be shown that by 
                                                     
25
 A prerequisite for using the DOLS approach is that the variables entering the model are non-stationary and that all the 
series are in a long-run relationship (cointegrated). As can be depicted from the results in Table A2 and A3 in the 
Appendix, in our case all series are integrated of order 1, i.e. they are I(1) (and thus non-stationary) and they are 
cointegrated. Results in Tables A2 and A3 only depict EA12 country samples. Results for an EU15 and EU27 country 
sample can be received from the authors upon request.  
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decomposing the error term and inserting the leads and lags of the right-hand side variables in first 
differences, the explanatory variables become (super-) exogenous and the regression results thus 
become unbiased. The baseline regression, which does not control for endogeneity and which reflects 
a situation whereby all adjustments have come to an end, has already been depicted in equation (1) in 
section 2. Within equation (1) wit is the iid-N error term with the properties of the classical linear 
regression model. Controlling for endogeneity requires the decomposition of the error term wit into the 
endogenous changes of the right-hand side variables, which are correlated with wit (the changes in the 
variables) and the exogenous part of the error term  it ;  
with  
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Inserting equation (3) into equation (1) leads to the following equation (4) in which all explanatory 
variables from the baseline model can be considered as exogenous: 
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with i  representing country fixed effects and   indicating that the variables are in first differences; 
the error term it  should fulfil the requirements of the classical linear regression model. 
Unemployment, inflation, growth and debt becomes exogenous and the coefficients 1 , 1 , 1 , 1  
and 1  follow a t-distribution. This property allows us to draw statistical inferences on the impact of 
unemployment, inflation, growth and debt on trust.
26
  
Omitted variables and autocorrelation 
Having found that trust and the economic variables (unemployment, inflation, growth and debt) are 
non-stationary and cointegrated (see Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix), we can be sure that omitted 
variables (which are lumped together in the error term) do not systematically influence our long-run 
relationship between trust and our macroeconomic variables. Omitted variables could be political 
factors (such as disappointment with politics in general) but also other economic factors (public 
expenditure per GDP, financial market distress, etc.). Even though the error term is stationary [I(0)], a 
characteristic of cointegration, autocorrelation might still be a problem that must be fixed.
27
 We do so 
by applying a Feasible Generalised Least Square (FGLS) procedure. Correcting for swings in the error 
term leads to the following equation: 
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26
 2 , 2 , 2 , 2  and 2  are coefficients that belong to the endogenous part of the explanatory variables and do not 
follow a t-distribution. Since we are not interested in the influence of these ‘differenced variables’ on trust, they will not 
be depicted. 
27
 We found first order autocorrelation to be present. 
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with i being the country fixed effect and   indicating that the variables are in first differences; * 
indicating that the variables have been transformed (purged from autoregressive processes) and that 
the error term itu  fulfils the requirements of the classical linear regression model (it is free from 
autocorrelation). Equation (5), which is an improved version of equation (4), represents the fixed 
effects dynamic feasible generalised least squares (FE-DFGLS) approach. The transformation of the 
variables take the following form as described in the following equation (6): 
,11
*
 ititit TrustTrustTrust  ,11
*
 ititit ntUnemploymentUnemploymentUnemployme   
,11
*
 ititit InflationInflationInflation  ,1
*
ititit GrowthGrowthGrowth   
,11
*
 ititit DebtDebtDebt  11
*
 ititit ZZZ  and 11  ititit vvu  ,        (6) 
where the differences of the explanatory variables are transformed in exactly the same way as the 
variables in levels. One should note that the new error terms itu  
are free of autocorrelation and that 
swings in the error term are eradicated by transforming the variables. Since the coefficient 1  is 
usually unknown (as in our case), it has been estimated by means of, e.g. the Cochrane-Orcutt method, 
an FGLS procedure.
28
  
4.2 Econometric results 
Estimating equation (5), Regression 1 in Table 3 reports the results for the full sample for the link 
between unemployment and trust in the NG. Trust in the NG is negatively and significantly (99% 
level) associated with unemployment with a coefficient of -3.9. Given that we would expect a 
structural break caused by the crisis,
29
 regressions 2 and 3 report the results for a pre-crisis (from 4-
5/2000 to 3-5/2008) and a crisis sample (from 10-11/2008 to 11/2012). In the pre-crisis period 
regression 2, the relationship is only significant at the 90% level and the coefficient is smaller with -
3.5. In the crisis sample, in regression 3, the relationship is negative and highly significant with a 
coefficient of -8.0. With a coefficient of this size, one can conclude that in times of crisis a 1 
percentage point increase of unemployment is related to a decrease of 8.0 percentage points in net trust 
in the national government. In addition, it becomes apparent that the highly significant association in 
the full sample is strongly driven by the crisis period. Regressions 4 to 6 in Table 3 show the same 
estimation results, although this time for trust in the NP. A similar picture can be detected. The 
negative and highly significant coefficient of -3.2 in the full sample, regression 4, is strongly driven by 
the crisis period, regression 6. In times of crisis a 1 percentage point increase of unemployment is 
associated with a decrease of 7.3 percentage points in net trust in the NP.  
  
                                                     
28
 FGLS is not compatible with time fixed effects but picks up shocks and their influence over short-to medium term 
periods. As we have reasons to believe that the countries within our sample are usually affected very differently by the 
same ‘general’ event, we do not favour the use of time dummies within this paper. The crisis has especially affected those 
countries having commercial and investment banks with considerable international exposure and tight financial markets 
do more harm to countries with a housing bubble, such as Spain and Ireland. By plugging in time dummies one would 
mimic the same exposure to an unspecified risk in all EA12 and EU15/27 countries under investigation. In addition, the 
potential inclusion of time dummies would not alter our results (see results in row 22 in Table 5), and it could be shown 
that time-fixed effects do not tackle the problem of autocorrelation of the error term. 
29
 In addition to the theoretical validity of differentiating a pre-crisis from a crisis period, empirically, a Chow-test showed a 
structural break between the pre-crisis period (3-4/1999 to 3-5/2008) and the crisis period (10-11/2008 to 11/2012). 
Results can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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Table 3.  
Unemployment and trust in the NG and NP, fixed-effects DFGLS estimations, EA12  
              
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable NG NG NG NP NP NP 
Period FS BC C FS BC C 
       Unemployment -3.9*** -3.5* -8.0*** -3.2*** -2.5* -7.3*** 
 (0.93) (1.78) (1.82) (0.75) (1.40) (1.28) 
       
Inflation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Government debt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Election dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.11 1.82 2.03 2.10 1.84 2.08 
Adjusted R-squared 0.82 0.81 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.88 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for endogeneity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elimination of first order autocorrelation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 248 143 105 248 143 105 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 
 
 
Notes: FS=Full Sample; BC=Before Crisis; C=Crisis; NG=National Government; NP= National Parliament. ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05 and *p<0.1. Data on growth of GDP per capita are missing for Greece from the 2nd semester of 2011 onwards. 
Thus, instead of 108, only 105 observations can be depicted. Data on the lagged first differences for debt over GDP are 
missing for the four time periods 1999-2000 and for Greece and Malta for the first semester of 2001. 
Regression 1 in Table 4 reports the results for the full sample for the association between 
unemployment and trust in the EC. Trust in the EC is negatively and significantly (95% level) 
associated with unemployment with a small-sized coefficient of -1.4. In the pre-crisis period, 
regression 2, the relationship is insignificant, indicating that in this specific time period in an EA12 
country sample changes in trust in the EC are not associated with changes in unemployment. In the 
crisis sample, in regression 3, the relationship is negative and significant (95% level) with a coefficient 
of -3.1 With a coefficient of this size, one can conclude that in times of crisis a 1 percentage point 
increase of unemployment is related to a decrease of 3.1 percentage points in net trust in the EC. In 
addition, it becomes apparent that the negative association in the full sample is driven by the crisis 
period. Regressions 4 to 6 in Table 4 show the same estimation results, although this time for trust in 
EP. A similar picture can be detected. The negative and significant (95% level) coefficient of -1.5 in 
the full sample, regression 4, is driven by the crisis period, regression 6. In times of crisis, a 1 
percentage point increase of unemployment is associated with a decrease of 3.4 percentage points in 
net trust in the EP. 
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Table 4.  
Unemployment and trust in the EC and EP, fixed-effects DFGLS estimations, EA12 
              
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable EC EC EC EP EP EP 
Period FS BC C FS BC C 
        
 
    
Unemployment -1.4*** 0.5 -3.1*** -1.5** 0.15 -3.4*** 
 (0.55) (0.94) (1.04) (0.60) (1.14) (0.94) 
Inflation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Government debt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Election dummy  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.14 2.05 2.04 2.17 2.10 2.03 
Adjusted R-squared 0.82 0.78 0.84 0.81 0.72 0.83 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for endogeneity  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elimination of first order autocorrelation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 272 167 105 272 167 105 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 
 
Notes: FS=Full Sample; BC=Before Crisis; C=Crisis; EC= European Commission; EP=European Parliament. ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05 and *p<0.1. Data on growth of GDP per capita are missing for Greece from the 2nd semester of 2011 onwards. 
Thus, instead of 108, only 105 observations can be depicted. Data on the lagged first differences for debt over GDP are 
missing for the four time periods 1999-2000 and for Greece and Malta for the first semester of 2001. 
4.3 Sensitivity of results  
As in particular the relationship between unemployment and trust throughout the crisis period would 
bear relevant policy implications, Table 5 reports the results of a sensitivity analysis for the crisis 
period. Row 1 in Table 5 depicts the four coefficients of the regressions 3 and 6 in Tables 3 and 4. 
Rows 2-4 exclude potential influential cases from the country sample. As can be inferred from Figure 
5, Spain, Greece and the EA4 function as influential cases for the negative association. When 
excluding Spain in row 2, trust in the NG, EC and EP lose their significance. The negative significant 
association between unemployment and trust in an EA12 country sample thus seems to be strongly 
driven by the Spanish case in which a significant increase in the unemployment rate has led to a 
significant decrease in trust. After the exclusion of Spain, trust in the NP, however, remains highly 
significant and the size of the coefficient unchanged (-7.3). When excluding Spain and Greece in row 
3, the coefficient of trust in the NP remains robust, although losing some significance (95% level) and 
strength (-6.3). Even when excluding three countries (Spain, Greece and Portugal) or all four 
periphery countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland) in rows 4 and 5, the size of the coefficient 
and 95-percent level of significance for trust in the NP are not altered, indicating the overall 
robustness of the negative relationship between unemployment and trust in the NP over the entire 
sample of the EA12.  
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Table 5.  
Sensitivity analysis for the baseline fixed-effects DFGLS model, EA12 
                  
Row Specification change 
 
NG  NP  EC  EP Obs. Cou. 
       
    
Baseline regression           
  1 No change 
 
-8.0*** -7.3*** -3.1** -3.4*** 105 12 
Exclusion of outliers 
       2 Spain 
 
-4.4 -7.3*** 0.8 0.7 96 11 
3 Spain+Greece 
 
-2.5 -6.3** 1.2 1.2 90 10 
4 Spain+Greece+Portugal 
 
-1.9 -6.1** 1.7 1.3 81 9 
5 EA4 
 
-2.8 -6.4** 0.1 0.1 72 8 
Restruc. of country sample 
       6 EU15 
 
-7.1*** -6.4*** -2.7*** -3.2*** 132 15 
7 EU27 
 
-1.1 -1.1 -2.1*** -2.3*** 240 27 
8 EU27 - Spain 
 
0.2 -0.1 -1.6** -1.7** 231 26 
9 EU27 - EA4 
 
-0.6 -0.1 -1.5** -1.6** 207 23 
10 NMS12 
 
0.8 2.3 -1.6* -1.7* 108 12 
Restruc. of time sample 
       11 9-11/2007-11/2012 
 
-6.0*** -5.4*** -2.4*** -2.8*** 129 12 
12 10-11/2008-5/2012 
 
-6.2*** -5.8*** -1.6 -1.7 94 12 
13 10-11/2008-11/2011 
 
-6.7** -6.3*** -2.4 -2.8** 83 12 
14 10-11/2008-5/2011 
 
-5.5 -5.8** -2.3 -3.0* 72 12 
15 10-11/2008-11-12/2010 
 
-9.1** -8.5*** -1.7 -2.0 60 12 
Incl. of additional variables 
       16 Sov. bond yields  
 
-8.9*** -7.4*** -3.0*** -3.6*** 105 12 
Alt. estimation strategies 
       17 OLS+TD 
 
-6.4*** -5.8*** -3.3** -3.7*** 117 12 
18 OLS+TD+SBY 
 
-6.4*** -5.7*** -3.1** -3.5** 117 12 
19 OLS+TD+SBY+EB74 
 
-5.6*** -4.9*** -1.8 -2.3 72 12 
Various alterations 
       20 Excl. special EB 71.1 
 
-6.7*** -6.2*** -2.5*** -3.1*** 93 12 
21 Net trust vs. trust 
 
-3.9*** -3.5*** -1.3** -1.6*** 105 12 
22 Inclusion of TD    -7.6*** -6.7*** -3.4*** -3.4*** 105 12 
 
Notes: EU=European Union, NMS=New Member States; NG=National Government; NP=National Parliament; 
EC=European Commission; EP=European Parliament; EA=Euro Area; TD=Time Dummies; SBY=Sovereign Bond Yields. 
EA-4 comprises Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.1.  
Rows 6-10 depict the results for different country samples. As expected in the EU15 (row 6), the 
results are very similar to that of the EA12.
30
 In the EU27 (row 7), unemployment is not significantly 
associated with trust in the NG and NP but is associated with trust in the EC and EP even when 
excluding Spain (row 8) and all four EA4 countries (row 9). In the NMS12 country sample (row 10), 
there is weak significance (90% level) for trust in the EC and EP. Rows 11 to 15 analyse the 
robustness of the coefficient when altering the time periods utilised. Since the beginning of the 
financial and economic crisis can be located as early as 2007 (Stiglitz 2012: 1), row 11 analyses a 
                                                     
30
 As elaborated above, the three EU-15 and non-EA-12 countries Denmark, Sweden and UK only experienced moderate 
declines of trust. Once excluding Spain from an EU-15 country sample, the negative relationship between unemployment 
and trust in the NG and NP remains robust, but the relationship between unemployment and trust in the EC and EP loses 
significance. Results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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crisis sample starting from 9-11/2007. All four trust coefficients remain unaltered and have the same 
size. Reducing one time period after another and starting with the observation in 11/2012, in rows 12 
to 15, trust in the NG and NP remains highly robust throughout the crisis.
31
 The negative relationship 
between unemployment and trust in the EC and EP turns out to be highly dependent on the 
observations from the year 2012, the second year of the sovereign debt crisis.
32
 Although we can be 
sure that our econometric analysis has not omitted any important variables, having shown that our time 
series are cointegrated as depicted in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix, row 16 includes the 
additional variable sovereign bond yields as most recent empirical results have stressed their 
importance for trust in the EC (Wälti 2012: 600-2). Once one includes the additional variable 
sovereign debt yields, all coefficients remain unchanged.
33
 To further compare our findings against 
those of the existing empirical literature concerning trust in the EC (Wälti 2012), rows 17 to 18 
estimate equation 1 with the help of ordinary least squares estimation with country and time fixed 
effects and cluster robust standard errors with and without the inclusion of sovereign debt yields. 
Coefficient for the NG and NP are slightly smaller with approximately -6 but overall all results remain 
robust. Once analysing a time frame from 2008 to 2010-2, in row 19, similar results as in row 15 can 
be detected. Whereas trust in the NG and NP remain highly significant in appropriate size, trust in the 
EC and EP lose their significance. It thus seems sound to conclude that the negative relationship 
between unemployment and trust in the EC is driven by the outcome of the 2
nd
 year of the sovereign 
debt crisis, which started in 2010, in the year 2012. Rows 20 to 22 perform three additional robustness 
tests. Once excluding the special EB71.1 in row 20, the results remain unchanged. Once estimating 
trust values instead of net trust values, in row 21, none of the coefficients loses significance although 
as expected the coefficients are now only half the size.
34
 The inclusion of time fixed effects instead of 
utilising the FGLS approach in row 22 does not alter the results, but leaves us with a poor Durbin-
Watson statistic of about 1.  
4.4 Coherence with previous empirical results 
Our econometric findings are in line with the empirical findings of Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) who 
find that unemployment has a significant and negative effect on trust in public institutions. When 
analysing the impact of an increase of unemployment on trust in the U.S. congress from 1972 to 2010 
the authors find a significant and negative effect of unemployment on trust with the size of the 
coefficient ranging from -0.89 to -1.36 depending upon the different types of data sources utilised. 
Although the authors utilise data for a non-European case, the U.S., and a longer time series (39 years 
vs. 13 years), the range of size of the reported coefficient is only slightly smaller than our estimated 
coefficient for trust in the national parliament of -1.4 when estimating the full sample over the 13-year 
time period.
35
 This coefficient range is however significantly smaller compared to our coefficient of -
3.5 throughout the crisis period, as depicted in row 20 in Table 5.  
Second, our results concerning the impact of the crisis on trust in the EC are ambivalent: they 
confirm and contradict the findings by Wälti (2012). When replicating his estimation and estimating a 
crisis time period until 11-12/2010, we confirm the non-significant relationship between 
unemployment and trust in the EC. However, when estimating a longer crisis time period until 
11/2012, we are able to reject his empirical findings that a decline in trust in the EC is not significantly 
                                                     
31
 Trust in the NP is more robust than trust in the NG, as trust in the NG turns out to insignificant when analysing the time 
period from October/November 2008 to May 2011 in row 16. 
32
 As has been mentioned above, the sovereign debt crisis started in 2010 (De Grauwe 2010). 
33
 This is not very astonishing as the descriptive part of this paper has shown, e.g. that trust in Spain has steadily decreased 
from 2008 onwards. The increase in sovereign bond yields in Spain, however, has been moderate throughout the crisis.  
34
 The net measure accounts for both: the movements in trust and mistrust, whereas trust only accounts for movements in 
trust. Thus changes in net trust will be approximately twice the value than changes in trust. 
35
 The coefficient is -1.4 when utilising trust instead of net trust. If estimating net trust, the coefficient is -3.2 as depicted in 
regression 4 in Table 3. 
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related to an increase in unemployment. Our analysis finds that when estimating a time period until 
11/2012 unemployment is significantly (99% level) and negatively (-3.1) related to net trust in the EC. 
This result is strongly driven by the Spanish case.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the impact of the crisis on trust in national and EU institutions. Two empirical 
conclusions can be drawn: 
First, concerning trust in the NG and NP, the crisis has not led to a universal decline of trust.
36
 The 
core countries from the EA12 such as Germany, Austria and Finland
37
 have actually higher trust levels 
in 11/2012 than before the crisis in 3-5/2008. The opposite is true for the periphery countries for the 
EA12. In countries such as Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland,
38
 trust in the NG and NP declined 
significantly. These countries have left their long-term trust trends. Thus the alleged trust crisis in the 
NG and NP is not an EU-scale crisis, but primarily manifests in the periphery countries of the EA12.  
Second, concerning trust in the EU institutions, although an overall moderate decline in trust in the 
EC and EP can be detected among most EU27 countries,
39
 trust declines in the four periphery 
countries of the EA12 Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland
40
 have been more pronounced than in all 
other countries, particularly in Spain and Greece. These countries have departed from their long-term 
trust trends. Thus, the alleged trust crisis in the EC and EP has registered at only a modest scale 
throughout all member states of the EU; it is primarily in the periphery countries of the eurozone, that 
the loss of trust has reached crisis proportions.  
In more detail the following ten empirical findings emerge within our analysis. 
i) In analysing the effects of the crisis on citizens’ population weighted trust in the 
national and EU institutions for an EU15/27 country sample, one detects moderate 
declines in trust in the national government and parliament, but more pronounced 
declines in relation to the European Commission and European Parliament since the 
start of the crisis. This overall decline in population-weighted trust in all four trust 
trends has strongly been driven by the countries of the EA12. 
ii) Whereas in the core of the EA12 trust in the national government and parliament has 
actually increased or remained unchanged, in its periphery trust in the national 
government and parliament has fallen significantly and steadily since the start of the 
crisis. This sharp and steady fall in the periphery explains the overall moderate decrease 
of population weighted trust in the national government and parliament in the EA12, 
EU15 and EU27.  
iii) While trust in the European Commission and European Parliament has declined in the 
core of EA12, in the periphery it has done so to a greater extent. Thus, the overall 
pronounced fall of population-weighted trust in the European Commission and 
European Parliament in the EA12, EU15 and EU27 is to a strong extent driven by those 
four periphery countries.  
                                                     
36
 This interpretation concerning European citizens’ trust in NG is shared by other scholars who come to the conclusion that 
“in the vast majority of countries the aggregate level trust did not change dramatically” (Armingeon and Guthmann 2012: 
22).  
37
 The EU-15 and non EA-12 country Sweden and the NMS-12 country Poland have also registered increases in trust in the 
NG and NP. 
38
 As mentioned above, Cyprus faced the most significant decline in trust. 
39
 The two Scandinavian countries Denmark and Finland are opposite examples. In both countries trust in the EC and EP 
has actually increased throughout the crisis.  
40
 As mentioned above, also Cyprus. 
Felix Roth, Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D. and Thomas Otter 
20 
iv) Whereas the population-weighted trust trends in the core countries of the EA12 have 
followed their pre-crisis paths throughout the crisis, the population-weighted trends in 
the periphery countries have departed from their pre-crisis paths since the start of the 
crisis. This phenomenon applies in particular to the case of Spain.  
v) When analysing the drivers of trust with the help of a FE-DFGLS estimation within an 
EA12 country sample and timeframe from 1999-2012, an increase of unemployment 
turns out to be significantly and negatively associated with trust in the national and EU 
institutions.  
vi) The highly significant and negative relationship between unemployment and trust is 
strongly driven within the crisis period (2008-2012). The coefficients for trust in the NG 
and NP are twice as high in the crisis period as in the pre-crisis period. The relationship 
between unemployment and trust in the EC and EP is not even significant in the pre-
crisis period but highly significant in the crisis period. 
vii) Within the EA12, whereas this highly significant and negative relationship between 
unemployment and trust the NG, EC and EP throughout the crisis is strongly driven by 
the country case of Spain, in which a significant increase in the unemployment rate is 
strongly associated with a decrease of trust, the relationship between unemployment and 
trust in the NP remains highly robust even after the exclusion of Spain from the EA12 
country sample. 
viii) Whereas this highly significant and negative relationship between unemployment and 
trust in the NG and NP remains robust throughout the whole crisis period, the 
significant relationship between unemployment and trust in the EC and EP is strongly 
driven by the time period from the year 2012, and thus seems to be related to an 
increase of unemployment as an outcome of the 2nd year of the sovereign debt crisis in 
the euro area which started in 2010. 
ix) The relationship between unemployment and trust in the NP holds strongly for an EA12 
country sample. Within the EA12, in times of crisis, a 1 percent increase in 
unemployment rates is associated with a decrease of net trust of -7.3 percentage points 
(a decrease of trust of -3.5 percentage points).  
x) With Spain and Greece being EA12 countries and having reached levels of -76 and -80 
percentage points of net trust in the NP in November 2012, respectively, a further 
increase of three percentage points of unemployment would lead to a complete loss of 
trust in the NP in those two countries.  
Overall, on the basis of all patterns analysed in this paper, it is the steady decline of trust in the 
national parliaments in Spain and Greece that are the most worrying, as both countries can be 
characterised as young democracies.
41
 If one takes sociological and political theory seriously, a 
complete loss of citizens’ trust in the NP in Spain and Greece might ultimately lead to an abolition of 
this kind of institutional arrangement.  
  
                                                     
41
 In 11/2012 (EC2012b), although “satisfaction with democracy” in Spain is still at 32%, it is as low as 11% in Greece. 
Comparable figures for Germany and Finland are 70% and 78%, respectively.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Time series for the all individual countries  
Figure A1. 
Net trust in the national government, by EU27 country (1999–2012) 
 
 
Notes: Y-axis displays a range from -100 to +50. For the EU-15 countries, the data commence in spring 1999 
(EB 51). For the 12 new member states, the data commence in 10-11/2004 (EB 62), even for Romania and 
Bulgaria. Data for EBs 52-54 and EB 58 are missing and have been automatically been interpolated by Stata. As 
the figure depicts net trust, all values below 0 indicate a lack of trust by the majority of respondents. In the case 
of Great Britain, data from EBs 51-69 are for Great Britain, whereas data from EB 70 onwards are for the UK. 
Sources: Standard EBs 51-78 and Special EB 71.1. 
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Figure A2. 
Net trust in the national parliament, by EU27 country (1999–2012) 
 
 
Notes: Y-axis displays a range from -100 to +50. For the EU-15 countries, the data commence in spring 1999 
(EB 51). For the 12 new member states, the data commence in 10-11/2004 (EB 62), even for Romania and 
Bulgaria. Data for EBs 52-53 and EB 58 are missing and have been automatically been interpolated by Stata. As 
the figure depicts net trust, all values below 0 indicate a lack of trust by the majority of respondents. In the case 
of Great Britain, data from EBs 51-69 are for Great Britain, whereas data from EB 70 onwards are for the UK. 
Sources: Standard EBs 51-78 and Special EB 71.1. 
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Figure A3. 
Net trust in the European Commission, by EU27 country (1999–2012) 
 
 
Notes: Y-axis displays a range from -50 to +50. For the EU-15 countries, the data commence in spring 1999 (EB 
51). For the 12 new member states, the data commence in 10-11/2004 (EB 62), even for Romania and Bulgaria. 
As the figure depicts net trust, all values below 0 indicate a lack of trust by the majority of respondents. In the 
case of Great Britain, data from EBs 51-69 are for Great Britain, whereas data from EB 70 onwards are for the 
UK. 
Sources: Standard EBs 51-77 and Special EB 71.1. 
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Figure A4. 
Net trust in the European Parliament, by EU27 country (1999–2012) 
 
 
Notes: Y-axis displays a range from -50 to +50. For the EU-15 countries, the data commence in spring 1999 (EB 
51). For the 12 new member states, the data commence in 10-11/2004 (EB 62), even for Romania and Bulgaria. 
As the figure depicts net trust, all values below 0 indicate a lack of trust by the majority of respondents. In the 
case of Great Britain, data from EBs 51-69 are for Great Britain, whereas data from EB 70 onwards are for the 
UK. 
Sources: Standard EBs 51-78 and Special EB 71.1. 
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Appendix 2. Background Statistics 
Table A1.  
Summary statistics EA12, EU15, EU27 
              
Variable Obs Time Periods Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
EA12  
      
Net trust in national governments 300 25 -10.8 30.2 -85 61 
Net trust in national parliaments 312 26 -3.6 27.2 -80 57 
Net trust in the European Commission 348 29 21.7 19.1 -57 57 
Net trust in the European Parliament 348 29 27.1 18.5 -43 62 
Unemployment 348 29 7.9 3.7 1.9 25.4 
Inflation 348 29 100.9 9.6 78.9 122.7 
Growth of GDP per Capita 342 29 0.6 1.5 -6.6 6.4 
Government debt over GDP 323 27 67.7 31.7 5.6 167.2 
Sovereign bond yields 348 29 4.5 2 1.4 23.4 
       
EU15  
      
Net trust in national governments 375 25 -10.1 29.6 -85 61 
Net trust in national parliaments 390 26 -0.2 29.5 -80 71 
Net trust in the European Commission 435 29 18.0 21.1 -57 57 
Net trust in the European Parliament 435 29 23.5 21.2 -50 62 
Unemployment 435 29 7.5 3.5 1.9 25.4 
Inflation 435 29 101.1 9.4 78.9 123.1 
Growth of GDP per capita 429 29 0.6 1.5 -6.6 6.4 
Government debt over GDP 404 27 63.6 30.1 5.6 167.2 
Sovereign bond yields 435 29 4.5 1.9 1.2 23.4 
       
EU27 
      
Net trust in national governments 486 18 -21.1 32.2 -85 61 
Net trust in national parliaments 486 18 -19.5 36.9 -90 71 
Net trust in the European Commission 486 18 21.0 19.8 -57 56 
Net trust in the European Parliament 486 18 24.4 20.1 -50 63 
Unemployment 486 18 8.4 3.8 3.0 25.4 
Inflation 486 18 110.5 10.9 90.9 148.3 
Growth of GDP per capita 483 18 0.7 2.2 -11.5 5.9 
Government debt to GDP 486 18 53.1 30.8 3.4 167.2 
Sovereign bond yields 467 18 4.8 2.3 1.2 23.4 
 
Notes: EU27 country sample starts from 10-11/2004, even for Bulgaria and Romania. 
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Table A2.  
ADF-panel unit root tests, EA12 
        
Variable Observations ADF-Fisher Chi-square Probability 
Trust NG 192 17.1 0.85 
Trust NP 192 9.9 0.99 
Trust EC 288 20.2 0.68 
Trust EP 288 11.9 0.98 
Unemployment 288 27.1 0.3 
Inflation 288 6.3 0.99 
Growth 270 24.6 0.43 
Debt 263 9.2 0.99 
SBY 288 12.8 0.97 
 
Note: H0: Series has a unit root (individual unit root process).  
Table A3.  
Kao residual cointegration test, EA12 
 
      
Cointegration between the following set of variables Observations ADF-t-statistic Probability 
Trust NG and explanatory variables 348 4.6 0.00 
Trust NP and explanatory variables 348 4.7 0.00 
Trust EC and explanatory variables 348 2.0 0.02 
Trust EP and explanatory variables 348 2.3 0.01 
 
Note: H0: No cointegration.  
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